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1  Introduction
If the goal of scientists is the acquisition of knowledge, then knowledge in general 
and scientific explanation in particular can surely be understood to be the product of 
that pursuit articulated as a unified set of observation statements. However, those 
focusing on scientific practice, disagree. They claim that knowledge is always under-
stood with reference to a particular context and in light of the actions of an epistemic 
agent. Knowledge-making activities are not the result of universal rules for deriving 
explanation from facts but the result of critical intersubjective modes of investigation. 
A science-in-practice approach turns our attention to the activities of and communi-
cation between scientists in order to understand and characterize the nature of scien-
tific inquiry. As such, it is part of what has been referred to as the practice turn.1 This 
refocusing of science on scientific practices highlights the activities that are revealed 
when we look at the processes and doings of science by scientists and scientific com-
munities (e.g. hypothesizing, testing, experimenting, theorizing, measuring) rather 
than exclusively on the products of science (e.g. knowledge, equations, devices, theo-
ries). The practice turn in philosophy of science is not an apologetic for an and-
practice-too approach to the metaphysics of science. A focus on practice provides a 
route to understanding the nature of the world in ways that have been, until recently, 
marginalized by aggressive demarcationist interests within traditional philosophy of 
science. This form of aggressive demarcationism held that research seeking to inves-
tigate scientific activity and the work of scientists was not really philosophy but just 
1 For research within the philosophy of science in practice and sociology of science in practice, see 
for instance the work of Hacking (1992, 1995), Dupré (1993), Chang (2004), Rouse (1996, 2003), 
Rheinberger (2005), De Regt et al. (2009), Soler (2012), Soler et al. (2014), and Kendig (2016b, c).
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sociology.2 Within philosophy, there was no worse criticism than the suggestion that 
what one’s putatively philosophical research was up to was not philosophy but was 
instead sociology. For many in philosophy, the criticism amounted to disciplinary 
slur, and one to be avoided. This active avoidance by philosophers of science to 
engage with sociology of science meant that rather than crossing the divides between 
philosophy and sociology, many were instead burning any bridges that remained 
between them in an effort to protect the discipline from invasion.
Rather than seeking a purely theoretic approach to knowledge or wholly analytic 
approach to explanation, a philosophy of science in practice approach focuses on 
the activities required in theory-making, knowledge-making, and explaining. Why 
is this important? Focusing on an activity-based analysis allows us to “go beyond 
thinking about scientific explanation in terms of logical relations between explanan-
dum and explanans, [and] we can consider how the act of explaining arises and how 
it is best performed” (Chang 2011: 208). So called pure theoretic approaches that 
omit reference to practice succeed in doing so only by assuming science and knowl-
edge acquisition to be a subjectless state of affairs—activities with no actors, under-
standing with no one who understands, and modelling with no modellers. Chang 
suggests the solution to this problem is for us to go against the convention of avoid-
ing the second person familiar “you” in our discourse, explanations, and discussions 
(Chang 2011). We should (as philosophers, sociologists, and scientists) recover the 
importance of what knowledge is as something you or I understand or explain, 
rather than as disembodied subjectless answers to questions (Chang 2011, 2016).
Implementing a science-in-practice approach, my aim is to turn attention to the 
work of practitioners reengineering metabolic pathways within chassis organisms 
such as E. coli. I ask, what, if anything, doing so can tell us about the relationship 
between the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical knowledge-making activi-
ties. As such it constitutes an activity-based analysis of scientific explaining and 
normative ethical thinking. If successful, it would suggest that an examination into 
the practice of science may also provide answers, (or at least more informed lines of 
questioning), for other long-discussed problems in philosophy.
I begin with a brief metaphysics and epistemology of classification. Disciplines 
have a system of classification that specifies the kinds of things that are the subject 
of study for that discipline, e.g. the periodic table of elements, plate tectonics, the 
DSM (Dupré 2006). Synthetic biology is no different. To understand the classifica-
tion system one must focus on the processes by which it is used and made. Our 
behaviour is informed by what kinds of things we (presuppose) we are interacting 
with as well as the goals and values we rely upon in our investigation. In the first 
half of the chapter, I examine the nature of scientific inquiry and how the manipula-
2 Chang has also pointed out the tendency of traditional philosophers of science as well as analytic 
philosophy in general to use the “just sociology” claim as criticism of practice based approaches 
to philosophy: “In the typical analytic philosopher’s picture, the scientist only enters as a ghostly 
being that either believes or doesn’t believe certain descriptive statements, fixing his beliefs fol-
lowing some rules of rational thinking that remove any need for real judgment. All the things that 
do not fit easily into this bizarre and impoverished picture are denigrated as pieces of “mere” 
psychology or sociology” (Chang 2014: 70).
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tion and use of different techniques within synthetic biology has metaphysical 
implications for the notion of parts and wholes, modularity, biological organization 
and function. The second half explores the social aspect of scientific inquiry in an 
attempt to reveal how normative valuations and ethical judgements are formed 
within and across synthetic biology communities. It concludes with a suggestion for 
how the epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical modes of inquiry are connected 
in networks of practitioners working together as moral agents—and that kinds of 
moral objects, epistemic objects, and metaphysical objects are made kinds through 
the activities of practitioners within these networks.
2  Categories of Epistemological Activity in Synthetic Biology
Early conceptual work in synthetic biology identified three different knowledge- 
making distinctions that exist within the field (see O’Malley et al. 2008; O’Malley 
2009;  Morange 2009a). These were intended to distinguish three overlapping 
epistemological categories. The categories demarcate diverse knowledge-making 
distinctions that lead to different questions being asked, different methods used, dif-
ferent knowledge acquired through these, and different products or outcomes 
(O’Malley et al. 2008). The first of these three categories is whole genome engineer-
ing. In this, biological processes and modules are co-opted and redesigned to solve 
technological problems for the production of energy or chemicals required for vari-
ous industries. The most publicized example of this was the synthesis of the first 
self-replicating, synthetic bacterial cell. This was achieved by Craig Venter and his 
company, Synthetic Genomics, who synthesized an entire bacterial genome and 
used it to replace the genome of Mycoplasma mycoides thereby creating JCVI- 
syn1.0 (Gibson et al. 2010; Hylton 2012). The second is the engineered construction 
of functional parts, processes, pathways, devices, and systems (Brent 2004; Endy 
2005). The current attempts to modify metabolic pathways in bacteria, yeast, and 
algae to generate biofuels are examples of this (Dellomonaco et al. 2010; Georgianna 
and Mayfield 2012; Wang et al. 2013). This involves the design and testing of bio-
logical systems and their component parts. Understanding of these functional sys-
tems is born out in their decomposition, manipulation, and co-option. Understanding 
of these parts and networks is based on the structure and syntax of the system. 
Describing the syntactic structure of the biological network using engineering, 
logic, or mathematical models, researchers can gain knowledge of the behaviour of 
the module or pathway in terms of its input and output conditions. The third cate-
gory of investigation is synthetic experimental evolution or protocell creation 
(Erwin and Davidson 2009; Morange 2009a). In this endeavour, synthetic biology 
seeks to understand the process of evolution, biological organization, and the nature 
of modularity. Understanding the process also opens up the potential to optimize the 
modules, networks, and systems which direct it.
This initial tripartite classification of synthetic biology provided important 
knowledge-making distinctions in the modes of research and knowledge based on 
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these but it also led to further metaphysical questions. For instance, what kinds are 
the parts and processes to which these categories refer? And, what kinds of things 
are the parts, modules, and systems used within the discipline of synthetic biology? 
Pablo Schyfter3 (2012) suggests what he calls an initial “exploration into things and 
kinds” offering a “first look analysis” of kindhood for the products of synthetic biol-
ogy and suggests that they fit imperfectly within both technological kinds and natu-
ral biological kinds. He is critical of synthetic biologists for not considering 
kindhood and for using engineering as the model and exemplar on which to base 
synthetic biology.
Determining what kinds (i.e technological kinds or natural biological kinds or 
something else) exist in synthetic biology may ultimately rest on how the discipline 
itself and how it is understood in relation to other biological and engineering disci-
plines. The discipline of synthetic biology is sometimes conceived of by practitio-
ners and detractors as a subset of functional biology and as such is characterized as 
an application-based, or technology-based mode of understanding that seeks to 
explain how something works (see Schyfter 2012 for problems with this view). It has 
also been characterized as evolutionary biology due to its attempt (especially in pro-
tocell creation) to answer why-questions: seeking why (rather than how) biological 
pathways, devices, and parts work. This difference in the attribution of goals, prod-
ucts, and techniques depending on what types of questions are being asked make the 
categorization of synthetic biology as a hybrid or disunified discipline unsurprising. 
Its growing epistemic and methodological toolkit seems likely to continue apace--
the result of sourcing and modifying techniques from biology, chemistry, computer 
science, mathematics, and engineering (see Morange 2009b; Keller 2009; O’Malley 
et al. 2008 for discussions of the discipline-building of synthetic biology).
But relying on this dichotomy of functional and evolutionary biology, of how- 
and why-questions does not seem entirely justified—or at least is not always eluci-
datory—within synthetic biology. Knowledge-seeking questions within synthetic 
biology do not focus purely on how-questions directed for the purpose of modifying 
function. I suggest elsewhere (Kendig 2016a, b) that such dichotomizations fail to 
identify the union of how- and why-questions, their mode of investigation, and cat-
egorization and kind-making (or what I’ve called “kinding”) practices typified by 
synthetic biology. The making or constructing of material objects, mechanisms, 
processes, or pathways; the theoretical construction of models and algorithms; as 
well as the devising of repeatable methods and techniques being made in synthetic 
biology are all instances of kinding—where kinding is understood as the epistemo-
logical and ontological activities within the practice of synthetic biology and by 
which the categories of that discipline or subdiscipline are configured. The outputs 
of these practices—the products of diverse synthetic biological research aims, are 
exchangeable and repeatable activities that represent, explain, and further advance 
3 Schyfter (2012) considers and evaluates the appropriateness of conceiving the products of syn-
thetic biological research as kinds of technological objects. The discussion here differs from his 
insofar as I take a practice-based account of kinds that focuses on kinds of modules (see also 
Sprinzak and Elowitz 2005; Keller 2009).
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our understanding of the relation of parts and wholes, the manipulation of develop-
mental pathways, and the nature of biological functioning and organization. This is 
exemplified in the engineered construction of functional parts, processes, pathways, 
devices, and systems (Brent 2004; Endy 2005). For example, the current attempts to 
modify metabolic pathways in bacteria, yeast, and algae to generate biofuels 
(Dellomonaco et al. 2010; Georgianna and Mayfield 2012; Wang et al. 2013) rely on 
the modification of metabolic pathways through design and testing of biological 
systems and their component parts.
Understanding of these functional systems is born out in their decomposition, 
manipulation, and co-option. The type of synthetic biology focused on the engi-
neered construction of functional parts, processes, pathways, devices, and systems 
is in the business of producing standardized parts, devices, pathways and modules 
with known functions. Standard biological parts with known functions are cata-
logued in a number of registries (e.g. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Registry 
of Standard Biological Parts). Insofar as these parts are kinds, this practice is the 
making of these parts.
In response to Schyfter (2012), I suggest that the imperfect fit of the parts and 
processes of synthetic biology into technological or biological kinds is because that 
which is kinded is epistemologically heterogeneous. If synthetic biology provides 
knowledge of how systems work, then the explanations of nature it provides (e.g. 
about how to re-engineer and manipulate them) suggest that it may be more profit-
ably conceived of as a discipline that is epistemologically, ontologically, and meth-
odologically hybrid. In the next section, I characterize the practice of part-making 
in metabolic engineering. I suggest that this practice can be couched in terms of 
different kinds of modularizing. It can be understood as a study of kinds of synthetic 
biological objects in the making and the nature of those things that make up the 
discipline (and subdisciplines) of synthetic biology.
3  The Tangle of Modularity
The activities of practitioners whose work focuses on the engineered construction 
of functional parts, processes, pathways, devices, and systems appear to be at least 
in part based on an underlying philosophical premise—that the world is organized 
in a certain way—that living organisms have an organization that is modular and 
that the variation that natural selection acts upon results from the recombining of 
modules. The premise of biological modularity is an ontological claim that appears 
to come out of this particular form of synthetic biological practice. We understand 
that the biological world is modular because we can manipulate different parts of 
organisms in ways that would only work if there were discrete parts that were inter-
changeable. This is the foundation of the BioBrick assembly method widely used in 
synthetic biology (Knight 2003). It is one of a number of methods that allows prac-
titioners to construct and reconstruct biological pathways and devices using DNA 
libraries of standardized parts with known functions.
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Because of its pick-and-mix approach to disciplinary tool sourcing, synthetic 
biology may be particularly well-suited to unpick the tangled meanings of concepts 
that have been long-debated within evolutionary and functional biology (Morange 
2009a: 374). Modularity, constraints, and convergence can be stripped down and 
analysed and given functional parts-language descriptions through synthetic bio-
logical experimentation and manipulation of genomes of model organisms, such as 
that of the synthetic biology workhorse, E. coli. In the following, I explore how 
metabolic engineering, as an epistemic tool, may be used to disentangle the multiple 
notions of two of these concepts—modularity and fitness.
Modularity has been a concept much discussed (Schlosser and Wagner 2004; 
Wagner et al. 2007). Although seen to be a central principle of functional biology in 
general and synthetic biology in particular, it continues to cause confusion. Within 
the emerging discipline of synthetic biology, this inbuilt ambiguity means that con-
text is usually required for the use of the term to confer knowledge about the system 
from one practitioner to another.
“Modularity” is used to identify at least two different kinds of claims within 
synthetic biology. I refer to these different forms following the philosophical con-
vention for discriminating broad claims from specific claims of concepts using 
uppercase and lowercase letters: Modularity and modularity.4
 1. Modularity. A general thesis about the nature of all biological organization as 
being made up of relatively independent components, like building blocks. This 
can be a metaphysical claim: that the organization of living things is Modular; a 
claim that applies with univocality to all biological structures. It can be a meth-
odological claim; that the best way to proceed with research is to look for 
Modularity. It can be an epistemic claim, that the world is knowable and we gain 
understanding by considering it is Modularly organized.5
 2. modularity. A specific claim about the parthood of a particular organism, path-
way, device, or process. This conception focuses on the property of being a part 
and the metaphysical relationship of individuation or composition of it as it 
relates to a whole. The claim of modularity is one about the nature of parts and 
wholes. Included under this kind of claim are various sub-characterizations, for 
instance: that parts are relatively autonomous, interchangeable, or independent 
of the context of other parts, carry out measurable functions, standardisable, or 
are non-decomposable.
These two forms frame different spaces of epistemological and ontological investi-
gation. In doing so, they configure the level of biological organization to which the 
4 When referring simultaneously to “Modularity” and “modularity” I will use the admittedly awk-
ward “M/modularity”.
5 Each of these claims can be either conceived of from a realist, antirealist, operationalist, or prag-
matic view as well as either one of monism or pluralism. For instance, one might suggest 
Modularity is a pragmatic methodology (and that we can be agnostic about whether the world is or 
is not really Modular). Someone may justify this claim that it is Modular insofar as our best knowl-
edge comes from a working hypothesis of Modularity that is a heuristic guiding synthetic biology 
research.
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theses of M/modularity apply, and the referent to which they apply (e.g. processes, 
objects, relationships, and properties).
3.1  Assembly Methods Affecting Modularity
Synthetic biology is based on a general thesis of biological Modularity (Knight 
2003; Morange 2009a). The parts database of biological modules with well- 
characterized functions relies on this working hypothesis and the success of syn-
thetically produced networks and parts in practice seems to bear this out at least in 
some limited capacity. Taking a practice-focused approach to understanding 
Modularity suggests that the assembly method one uses affects the nature of 
Modularity of the parts, devices, and pathways one constructs.
The most commonly used assembly method, BioBrick assembly, is based on the 
standardization of basic parts with a prefix and a suffix (Knight 2003). Addition of 
these two short DNA sequences to any DNA element results in a BioBrick. Two 
BioBricks can be ligated together in either order to construct a composite that is 
itself a BioBrick containing a prefix and a suffix (Kendig and Eckdahl 2017). The 
central concept that enables BioBrick assembly to work is that type II restriction 
enzymes XbaI and SpeI produce compatible sticky ends (Kendig and Eckdahl 
2017). BioBrick assembly has been a popular method from its inception. However, 
it is not without problems. BioBrick assembly depends on purification of DNA frag-
ments after gel electrophoresis. The pairing of the DNA recognition sequences for 
XbaI and SpeI during ligation results in a mixed site that practitioners refer to as a 
BioBrick scar (Brent 2004; Endy 2005). The scar is six DNA nucleotides in length 
and has a defined sequence. There are applications in which the spacing between 
two parts must be smaller than six nucleotides or when the BioBrick scar sequence 
confounds the function of a device (Kendig and Eckdahl 2017). Another problem 
with BioBrick assembly is that once ligated together, two BioBricks cannot be taken 
apart for use in another construct (Knight 2003). Assembled BioBricks are compo-
nents that can no longer be swappable or interchangeable. In this way, the genera-
tion of the scar during BioBrick assembly affects the kinds of parts produced and 
their degree of Modularity. Being Modular means something different during 
BioBrick assembly because of this known outcome.6
3.2  Modularity and Modularizing
The claim of modularity is a claim specific to the compositional structure that parts 
and wholes exemplify in a particular system. As such, modularity is an answer to 
questions concerning: What is the nature of parts in that particular device or 
6 An extended discussion of modularity based on this example is contained in Kendig and Eckdahl 
(2017).
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pathway?, How are they organized?, or What is the relationship of the composi-
tional structure of them to the whole in question? It characterizes the property and 
nature of modulehood. This second kind of modularity avoids the problems that 
befall Modularity regarding different assembly methods. The things that are catego-
rized as modular are numerous and may come about due to differing processes of 
assembly or categorization. This kind of modularity defines modules by the action 
of modularizing. The assembly method used makes parts into modules insofar as 
they are chosen by practitioners to be connected or separated from other parts. What 
counts as a module (variously understood) and the criteria for modular kindhood 
may not be the same for all modules. That is, modularity may not be a property that 
can be univocally expressed for all parts—modularity allows for this.
This kind of modularity is not without problems. To say something is a module 
or part has typically meant that it bears some sameness relationship, family resem-
blance, or overlapping shared homeostatic set of properties to another part qua 
module. In this way, being a module—insofar as it is understood to be a property—
means that it is a property that is instantiable in one way. This means that all modules 
insofar as they are modules are homogeneously so. I think this is a mistake. This 
modulehood may be a kind differently instantiated. That is, modulehood for one 
thing may not be the same as modulehood for another in a radical and non- 
comparative way. Some might suggest that this brings into question the legitimacy 
of what it is that we refer to when we claim something is a module if there is no 
unifying claim. When faced with this proposition, they may prefer to dispense with 
all claims of modularity and become eliminitivists. Alternatively, they may embrace 
the heterogeneity of modulehood and allow that modulehood may be radically 
heterogeneous across all metaphysically parcelled out stuff. Despite its initial 
simple understanding, all modules may not belong to the same sui generis category—
modularity may not be something that is univocally expressed.
4  Evolvability
I move now from mapping out some of the conceptual terrain of modularity within 
synthetic biology to that of evolvability. How can evolvability be characterized in 
synthetic biology7? I suggest that it may be best understood as the capacity of a 
population, organism, device, part, or pathway to change over time—that evolvabil-
ity is the facilitated variation of self-organized systems (cf. Calcott 2014). Conceived 
in this way it can serve as an umbrella term under which natural, artificial, and 
synthetic change over time can be covered.
Evolvability relies on phenotypes being both plastic and stable. Phenotypes of 
organisms are plastic insofar as they are responsive to the continual variation within 
their environment. Phenotypes of organisms are stable insofar as they may develop 
7 For a recent discussion of evolvability and synthetic engineering that is complementary to the one 
presented here, see Calcott (2014).
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reliably despite changes in the resources available to the organisms. Novel phenotypes 
arise through the rearranging or recombining of ancestral phenotypes by the organ-
ism (West-Eberhard 2005: 6543). Organisms are able to coordinate the resources 
used in their own development because they are:
richly endowed with a capacity for facilitating variation, a small input of random mutation 
would lead to a large output of viable phenotypic variation … Instead of a brittle system, 
where every genetic change is either lethal or produces a rare improvement in fitness, we 
have a system where many genetic changes are tolerated with small phenotypic conse-
quences and whereas others may have selective advantages, but are also tolerated because 
physiological adaptability suppresses lethality (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005: 226).
If facilitated variation is the mechanism of natural selection, then it would appear 
that the inputs are modules. Organismal modularity maintains robustness of path-
ways whilst allowing recombination of relatively autonomous entities. Facilitated 
variation can be understood as explaining the evolvability of organisms through its 
self-organizing processes and its relationships to genetic and extragenetic resources. 
In this sense, the evolvability of organisms may be underpinned by the specific 
modularity thesis that takes the nature of organisms to be organized modularly. 
Organisms may change their features depending on a number of factors. These 
changes can be attributable to the self-organizing capacities of organisms in select-
ing which resources, in what order, and in what combination, are used as causes of 
their own development. The organism could be understood to be the author of its 
own variability. Its generic capacities may constrain deleterious variation or enhance 
variability that may be advantageous to it. Using these capacities, organisms may 
either buffer or enhance any variations to their genetic or extragenetic resources or 
perturbations in their inter- or extra-cellular environmental resources (Kendig 2014a).
An organism has both constraints and de-constraints on the variability of its phe-
notype. Its capacity for variation allows it to maintain itself across a wide range of 
conditions. The organism’s potential for different developmental variations lie in its 
capacity to self-organize its genetic and extragenetic resources. The organism’s 
common stock of generic capacities and resources has been understood by Mary 
Jane West-Eberhard (2003: 146) as its “phenotypic repertoire”. The organism’s phe-
notypic repertoire includes a number of highly conserved core processes: inter- 
cellular signalling and cell sorting (Goodwin et al. 1993); the capacity for weak 
linkage, exploratory behaviour, spatial patterning, compartmentation and modular-
ity of the body plan (cf. Kirschner and Gerhart 2005); the capacity of tissues to 
segment or form hollow tubes (cf. Minelli 2003); and the capacity to learn and 
remember (West-Eberhard 2003: Ch. 3, 7, 18). A thumbnail sketch of some of the 
ways in which variation is facilitated may be useful.
The capacity for weak linkage allows organisms to use a small number of mecha-
nisms relying mostly on the ability to reconfigure these as and when necessary for 
different functions. But because these linkages are weak, they are often retraced and 
duplicated by other pathways or circuits to strengthen them. The use of weak link-
ages means that there is higher versatility which the organism can use to alter 
these pathways when necessary. They offer a socket and plug model that facilitates 
interchangeability of different modules. If these were strong, static and unchanging 
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linkages, the organism would be arguably less fit to adjust to different environmen-
tal situations (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005: 136–7). In the course of evolution small 
changes result in wide variability and novelty. Weak linkages can be formed in 
many kinds of interactions, such as those between cells, cell populations, tissues, 
organs, organ systems, and behaviours. In this way, they confer a standardized way 
of connecting different modules to one another. Because these linkages are weak, 
individual organs, cells, tissues, or behaviours may also change independently. The 
exploratory behaviour of organisms is their responsiveness to different inputs and 
outputs. In building such things as neural networks or circuits, the organism begins 
by constructing a large number of alternative pathways. The best of these alternative 
pathways are selected and stabilized.
A conserved body plan – one that is retained over a succession of individual 
organisms  – enables independent variation of some features without adversely 
affecting others. It does so by compartmentation of the body plan into semi- 
autonomous functional and structural parts. This modularity of the organism’s parts 
increases its capacity for variation as changes in one subunit do not greatly affect 
others and thereby reduces the possibility of lethal variations. The more modular 
these subunits become, the greater the possibility of variation and specialization of 
these structural and functional units within the organism. The generic capacity to 
learn through exploratory behaviour provided certain motivating factors, such as the 
absence or presence of certain resources needed in the construction of a particular 
phenotypic trait or the performance of certain processes or behaviours (e.g. metabo-
lism, reproduction, locomotion, speech), enables the organism to vary its phenotype 
over its lifetime in a range of different contexts. Organisms may learn about their 
resources and environment by quorum sensing, by chemical cues or by virtue of 
their sensory organs. They may manipulate the objects within their immediate habi-
tat, investigate new resources or interact with new organisms (e.g. prey, potential 
mates, carers, symbionts) within this habitat, or search for a new one. Certain types 
of activities associated with access to food, protection from weather, increased soci-
ality or reproductivity, or fitness may result in some benefit or detriment to the 
organism). Activities that effectively increase or substantially decrease resources 
are remembered and repeated or avoided. These generic capacities allow organisms 
to vary their own development and the phenotypes they construct depending on how 
resources are used (Kendig 2014a).
4.1  How Can Engineered Metabolic Pathways Be Maintained?
Building on the discussion of facilitated variation in the last section, I now use this to 
return to discuss it in light of particular examples of metabolic engineering in microbial 
organisms to explain how pathways can be maintained in synthetic biology. Metabolic 
engineering depends on the discovery and investigation of natural metabolic 
pathways and the genetic elements that control them, on using that information to 
transform suitable host organisms for the desired orthogonal metabolism, and on 
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optimization of the metabolic output. The most high-profile product of metabolic 
engineering resulted in bacteria and yeast cells that produce the anti-malarial drug 
artemisinin, reducing its cost of production compared to purification from the sweet 
wormwood plant (Martin et al. 2003). Another is the recent attempts to engineer cells 
to make more of what they may make already, (e.g., single-celled algae producing 
oil, or producing a variation on what they would normally produce). This is exempli-
fied in the current research trend in publically and privately funded projects is to 
investigate the potential use of various species of algae for biofuel production (Kendig 
2014b). Algae produce lipids (oil) as a byproduct of the process of photosynthesis. 
The hope is that once the means of harnessing this store of energy is found, algal 
biofuels may provide an inexpensive alternative source of fuel that can be produced 
with little more than sunlight, carbon dioxide, and a small amount of water. While 
advances in synthetic biology research and the understanding of algal alternatives 
increase, the scaling up of these fuels requires significant further research resolving 
the problems of system optimization and photosynthetic efficiency as well as solving 
ways of producing these synthetic biofuels in quantities suitable for commercial use 
(Georgianna and Mayfield 2012). Various species of bacteria and yeast have been 
considered as particularly suitable for research into the production of synthetic bio-
fuels (Dellomonaco et  al. 2010). Cyanobacteria are another that initially appears 
promising. Cyanobacteria, like Synechocystis sp. PCC 6803, can provide a highly 
efficient organic system for producing biofuels as they can convert solar energy and 
carbon dioxide into biofuel molecules (Wang et al. 2013). Cyanobacteria are particu-
larly good candidates because they possess naturally occurring biosynthetic path-
ways that produce alkanes (a key component of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel). At 
present, research into the use of cyanobacteria for synthetic biofuel production is still 
in the very early stages and well behind that of algae research. However, research 
focused on reconfiguring these to create an organism that produces alkanes or alkenes 
at a rate that is double that of the wild type has been shown to be possible. Synechocystis 
mutants have been constructed that overexpress alkane biosynthetic genes (Kendig 
2014b). If their photosynthetic pathways were re-engineered, cyanobacteria may be 
able to produce alkanes or alkenes at a highly efficient rate (Wang et al. 2013).
But knowing how to sustain the orthogonal pathway over generations requires 
resolution of two problems. I refer to the first of these as the optimization problem. 
The optimization problem involves figuring out how synthetic biologists can 
enhance orthogonal metabolic output when they cannot know all of the variables 
that affect it in a host organism and its environment. I call the second problem the 
natural selection problem. How can the reduction in fitness in a population of organ-
isms engineered for an orthogonal metabolic pathway be prevented from causing 
evolution away from the desired metabolic output phenotype? The native metabo-
lism of all organisms is responsive to a vast array of internal and external variables 
including genotype, metabolite availability, pH, osmotic pressure, and temperature 
(Eckdahl et al. 2015).8 When synthetic biologists introduce orthogonal metabolism 
8 For an extended discussion of this example see Kendig and Eckdahl (2017) and Eckdahl et al. 
(2015).
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into a host organism, they can optimize metabolic output by taking into account the 
variables they know, but must ignore all of the variables they don’t know and some 
that they cannot know. Synthetic biology researchers also struggle with the difficulty 
of trying to make sure that the organisms they engineer with the ability to carry out 
orthogonal metabolism continue to faithfully replicate that genetic capacity. If the 
production of the product or the maintenance of the pathway is too onerous for the 
cell, the metabolic pathway will (after a number of generations) be disposed of. 
Those organisms without the onerously produced product or taxing pathway will be 
selected for in preference to those constructed to function by the synthetic biologist. 
To sum up in one sentence: synthetic biology’s biggest obstacle is natural selection.
4.2  Is Semisynthetic Evolvability Still Evolvability?
In the previous section, I suggested that evolvability may be understood as the 
capacity of an organism, device, part, or pathway to change over time—that evolv-
ability is the facilitated variation of self-organized systems. Conceived of in this 
way, evolvability was able to be used as an umbrella concept under which natural, 
artificial, and synthetic change over time can be covered. I now want to question the 
legitimacy of this as a category or kind. I suggest that synthetic biological research, 
as well as the orthogonal products and processes that it creates, sits in a liminal posi-
tion between engineered technological kinds (cf. Schyfter 2012) and natural (or in 
the language of synthetic biology “native”) biological kinds. If this liminality exists, 
it presents difficulties with regard to the notion of kindhood if kindhood is under-
stood to be a property of the contents of the world as already there for us. Why? To 
explain, I’ll use the butchery metaphor often used to explain the nature of natural 
kinds as being understood as picking out the natural categories in the world as carv-
ing nature at its joints. Synthetic biological research and the orthogonal products 
and processes that arise from it would suggest a notion of kindhood that does not 
rely on the pre-carved up contents of the world but instead a notion that involves the 
role of the carvers and—following the discussion of how assembly methods may 
affect modularity—the ascription of the joints.
As such, the goal of understanding evolvability is directed to the potential to 
modify and optimize the modules, networks and systems which direct it. This takes 
evolvability to be a capacity that can be defined, represented, measured, intervened 
upon and optimized. We might do better to call this “semisynthetic evolvability” as 
it differs from natural or artificial evolvability in that the synthetic biology practitio-
ner actively intervenes in the process of facilitated variation and employs the use of 
a suite of constructed parts and employs populations of organisms to solve the bio-
logical problem of optimization.
But the question remains: are semisynthetic evolvability and the umbrella con-
cept of evolvability as facilitated variation of self-organized systems legitimate and 
veridical categories of evolvability? And how are we to judge them? According to 
Morange, “Selection in nature and evolution directed by biochemists and molecular 
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biologists increasingly differ as technological progress is made in synthetic biol-
ogy” (Morange 2009a: 370). At first blush, this would suggest that semisynthetic 
evolvability may not count as evolution at all. Later on, however, Morange provides 
an alternative account. He argues against his initial suggestion that synthetically 
tweaked evolution does not count as evolution. He goes on to argue that current 
understanding of evolution is based on an unwarranted assumption of univocalism 
that could be challenged by findings in synthetic biology:
some of the extraordinary scenarios of evolution, designed by synthetic biologists, must be 
carefully considered by evolutionary biologists. Maybe the models provided by evolution-
ary biologists are too restrictive, leaving too much place to uniformitarianism, the hypothe-
sis that the mechanisms of evolution have always remained the same (Morange 2009a: 374).
Put stronger, perhaps evolutionary biologists have just been getting it wrong. 
Natural evolvability is actually more like semisynthetic evolvability. So research 
into the latter may yield understanding of the former. Judged according to Morange’s 
second suggestion, the umbrella category of evolvability can also be viewed as 
veridical insofar as it captures the heterogeneity of synthetic, artificial, and natural 
evolutionary mechanisms as well as their concomitant epistemic categories.
5  The Social Aspect of Scientific Investigation
In the foregoing, I have attempted to show that attending to the practices within 
synthetic biology—in particular to the reengineering of metabolic pathways—
reveals the generation of knowledge-making categories and the delineation of mod-
ules within the manipulation of biological parts, processes, and systems. I now turn 
to the social aspect of the practitioners’ work. Although the specific focus on meta-
bolic engineering is new, doing so relies heavily on Marjorie Grene’s much earlier 
identification of the work of scientists as being not just the subject of epistemology 
but also of ethical engagement. Writing in 1966, Grene states that scientists’ “work” 
is “an instance of the recognition of responsible persons, a performance of the same 
general kind as the recognition of patterns, individuals, or persons” (Grene 1966: 
223). Grene refers to the social nature of science as work that takes place in “social 
enterprises” (Grene 1985). But Grene is not alone in pointing to the ineliminability 
of the social within scientific inquiry. It has been characterized more recently in 
terms of “systems of practice” (Chang 2012), referred to in virtue ethics as “agent- 
based” interactions (Swanton 2003), been described as “social cognition” (Longino 
1990), and in some sense, it has been much earlier cashed out in terms of the con-
cept of “conviviality” (Polanyi 1962). I build on this formindable work, focusing on 
the social aspect of scientific investigation and the notion of a system of practice in 
order to identify the work of practitioners in a reticulated set of knowledge-making 
activities.
Following Grene, I take the work of scientists to rely on protocols as sets of 
explicit and implicit rules of action. The action of individual agents within the social 
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group of scientists is not the work of idealized decision-makers but seems to be 
biased on individuals whose beliefs are not entirely self-generated. That is, they do 
not form in a vacuum but from within a particular context and environment. As 
such, scientists working within social enterprises are agents that act from a particu-
lar embedded standpoint. Grene’s view seems underpinned by an agent-based view 
that investigates a perspective where action is always from a standpoint, but that the 
standpoint is located in social networks of knowledge producing practices. It is that 
place from which and as such a precondition for personal action. In this way Grene 
appears to rely on Polanyi’s notion of agency (see Polanyi 1962, and in particular, 
see Mullins 2009 for a discussion of Polanyi’s notion of agency). For Polanyi, sci-
ence is only considered possible within a society that acknowledges it by affirming 
the sorts of questions, types of reasoning, and value of their pursuit, advancement, 
and transmission of knowledge. Polanyi (1962: 203) suggests that scientific knowl-
edge is only possible because the sharing of knowledge is itself valued in society. 
That it is valued, makes science possible. He suggests that reliance on this social 
endorsement is pervasive—it is prerequisite to all epistemic and ethical knowledge. 
Polanyi illustrates the pervasiveness:
I cannot speak of a scientific fact, of a word, of a poem or a boxing champion; of last week’s 
murder or the Queen of England; of money or music or the fashion in hats, of what is just 
or unjust, trivial, amusing, boring or scandalous, without implying a reference to a consen-
sus by which these matters are acknowledged—or denied to be—what I declare them to be. 
I must continually endorse the existing consensus or dissent from it to some degree, and in 
either case I express what I believe the consensus ought to be in respect to whatever I speak 
of (Polanyi 1962: 209).
More recently, the pervasiveness of the social aspect of scientific enquiry as pre-
requisite for objective knowledge is later explored by Longino (1990). Longino’s 
interest is in characterizing the nature of knowledge acquisition, but she cautions,
Because we think the goal of the scientist’s practice is knowledge, it is tempting to follow 
tradition and seek solutions in abstract or universal rules. Refocussing on science as prac-
tice makes possible the second shift, which involves regarding scientific method as some-
thing practiced not primarily by individuals but by social groups (Longino 1990: 66).
The social nature of scientific practice that Longino suggests here emphasizes 
the intimate connection between the character of inquiry as a social and is prerequi-
site for what she refers to as “social cognition”—the idea that scientific inquiry is 
not simply an individual pursuit but an epistemic activity relying on the intersubjec-
tivity of critical dialogue within scientific study. In doing so, she follows Grene 
(1966, 1985) in fleshing out the nature of what it means to be a social enterprise and 
what I suggest Chang (2012) later identifies as a system of practice. According to 
Chang, the search for an agent-free or context-free set of categories is simply one 
that is ill-founded in philosophy. This is because knowledge is always something 
bound within what he refers to as a “system of practice”:
A system of practice is formed by a coherent set of epistemic activities performed with a 
view to achieve certain aims…[A]s with coherence of each activity, it is the overall aims of 
a system of practice that define what it means for the system to be coherent. The coherence 
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of a system goes beyond mere consistency between the propositions involved in its activi-
ties: rather, coherence consists in various activities coming together in an effective way 
toward the achievement of the aims of the system (Chang 2012: 16).
By focusing on systems of practice, Chang foregrounds the activities and goals 
of scientists within the pursuit of knowledge rather than with the product of their 
activity—the observations statements and their truth value. It is not the veridicality 
of statements on their own that tells us what constitutes success in science. In order 
to understand truth or anything like it, it is necessary to investigate how these state-
ments function within the knowledge-making activities of scientists. The assessing 
of truth or truthlikeness of any statement is valuable but context dependent (Chang 
2012: 17–18). Truth can only be assessed within the constraints of the goals and by 
the values set out by practitioners that are for instance, working towards solving a 
particular problem. That is, what counts as a solution depends on what is deter-
mined to be the problem.
What appears to connect Grene’s notion of social enterprises, Longino’s social 
cognition, and Chang’s systems of practice is a sense of the pervasiveness of the 
social nature of scientific investigation—a pervasiveness highlighted by Polanyi’s 
notion of conviviality, social endorsement, and dissent. I explore the pervasiveness of 
the social by looking once again to Polanyi’s notions in order to characterize an 
account of ethics. According to Polanyi, it is not the agreement of the community of 
individuals that leads to knowledge but the possibility of disagreement (Polanyi 
1962). Being in a community provides the environment that makes disagreement 
possible. To disagree is to see oneself as being against something and in the possibil-
ity of communicating that disagreement to another. Applying a Polanyi-inspired 
approach to normative ethics, I suggest that normative ethical evaluations are the 
result of loops of ethical reflectiveness of agents in a multi-agent network of practi-
tioners who construct the grounds for ethical knowledge through their intersubjective 
judgements. That is, normative ethical evaluations rely on what people think, what 
they do, how they do it, and how they communicate it to others. These evaluations are 
dependent on the epistemic capabilities of individuals multiply instantiated in net-
works of practitioners. In synthetic biology, these networks include human agents, 
but also their physical manipulations (e.g. measuring, weighing,  running gels), math-
ematical modelling, proxied or remote tool use, objects of study (e.g. chassis organ-
isms, BioBricks), and the extended social communities that they work within (e.g. 
research networks that span multiple institutions, iGEM competitions, international 
research networks). They are spatially, socially, and temporally extended.
5.1  Extended Agency Ethics
In the remaining, I briefly consider how synthetic biology practice reveals valua-
tional as well as the epistemic and ontological categories of research. I suggest that 
ethical categories, like the knowledge-making practices, are formed alongside these 
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within socially extended research groups and sketch an approach to understanding 
the generation of ethical knowledge. I refer to this form of ethical knowledge as 
“extended agency ethics” to emphasize the intersubjective nature of this social 
approach. Extended agency ethics can be understood as taking a naturalistic agent- 
based approach to ethics. I clarify the descriptors “extended” and “agency” one at a 
time before bringing them together. I refer to this approach as “extended” because 
this view relies on the extended-mind thesis in cognitive science (Clark 1995; Clark 
and Chalmers 1998). According to the extended mind thesis, thinking is not exclu-
sively something that happens in the brain, it is something that is spatiotemporally 
extended (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010). Mind includes brain but also 
includes tools used to aid thinking (e.g. language, culture, pencils, calculators, 
search engines, mobile phone apps, and other people). Knowledge is not just epis-
temologically embedded according to this view, but it shapes and is reciprocally 
shaped by our experiences in the world:
we use intelligence to structure our environment so that we can succeed with less intelli-
gence…it is the human brain plus these chunks of external scaffolding that finally consti-
tutes the smart, rational inference engine that we call mind (Clark 1998: 180).
I use this extended mind thesis to suggest how ethical decision making is inelim-
inably connected to the research practiced in groups—but these are groups of indi-
viduals capable of acting. I refer to “agency” in the description of the approach to 
indicate that the role of the individual agent. This agent based view of action implies 
that we, as agents, are the locus of our activities, e.g. measuring, mapping, or run-
ning gels, in order to effect changes beyond merely measuring, mapping, or running 
gels. Agents act for and towards a purpose beyond those movements. They are able 
to do so because they have certain causal knowledge of the result of the performance 
of these actions.9 The agents’ activities are not reducible to the events of measuring, 
mapping, or running gels because it is the person’s running a gel and not the gel’s—
to assume that these are the same thing is to reduce the agency of the agent to an 
event. Keeping in mind the ubiquity of the social as expressed by Polanyi, Grene, 
Longino, and Chang, extended agency ethics does not assume that intentionality is 
the sole domain of the individual nor that the decisions of the individual are autono-
mous. Individual scientists’ work is generated through a social process and forms a 
kind of interactive extended agency. That is, their research activities are extended 
over the members of the research group and coordinated in virtue of their shared 
intentionality in the form of extended cognition. These shared intentions provide the 
grounds for normativity in scientists’ social research interactions. Robert Wilson 
has recently suggested a view of extended agency akin to the one I have developed 
here and elsewhere, (Kendig 2016a), but within a separate context.10 He provides a 
9 I follow Hornsby’s account of irreducible agent causation here, (see Hornsby 2004: 11–14 for 
further discussion of agency in philosophy of action and Lowe 2009: 196–201 for further distinc-
tion between agent causation and event causation).
10 Wilson’s (2018) discussion of normativity is given in the context of the eugenics movement and 
in particular, within a critical analysis of the cognitive processes that lead to the marking of certain 
human variation as deficient and other variation as preferred within scientific practice.
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particularly helpful way of understanding how sociocognitive intentions can be con-
strued as being the basis for normativity:
Normativity exists when there is a distinction between a correct, proper, or appropriate way 
for a process, event, or outcome to turn out, and an incorrect, improper or inappropriate 
such way. Like extended cognition, normativity arises in and through both non-human and 
human cognition; it is not solely a feature of our own species’ activity. [L]ike extended 
cognition, the most familiar and robust forms of normativity are those that are the product 
of distinctly human practices and institutions that presuppose a kind of shared intentional-
ity…So we have a kind of externally mediated, cognitively driven normativity, and it con-
stitutes an important feature of human social life (Wilson 2018: 130).
Agency is, therefore, not restricted to the individual or to a limited number of 
individuals. It can extend to the social research network one participates within with 
its requisite values and practices. Extended agency provides a conception of the 
social character of scientific inquiry that attempts to make sense of it as research 
that is extended across events, environments, objects, and agents. My suggestion is 
that responsibility for the form of ethical evaluations is therefore also distributed 
across the system of agents within the network of practitioners.
So, what would a normative ethical decision-making process look like using 
extended agency ethics? In pursuing research to find a suitable organism to be used 
as a chassis for biofuel production, a team of researchers would use knowledge 
acquired from the related areas of research outputs of projects focusing on cyano-
bacteria, algae, and metabolism. They may use this broad investigative approach to 
narrow down the range of possible candidates for a chassis organism. They may 
initially investigate the current algae research and the metabolic pathway of the 
highly familiar, well-researched green algae, Chlamydomonas reinhardtii. 
Knowledge of the successes and problems associated with the reengineering of 
algae as a source of biofuel may lead to the choice of a cyanobacteria instead. Once 
a chassis is selected, they may focus attention on the synthetic construction of path-
ways that overexpress alkane biosynthetic genes. Following this, they may begin the 
task of generating stocks of the newly reengineered form of Synechocystic sp. In 
order to plan the most efficient scale-up ventures, economists as well as microbiolo-
gists may be contracted. Once enough product is produced, they may outsource 
some beta tests to chemical engineers for kinematic viscosity analysis of the 
cyanobacteria- based biofuel product. They may request assistance in testing com-
bustibility from colleagues specializing in physical chemistry. Limitations on what 
can be known and what can be done may come from the reciprocal knowledge 
exchanged through these interactions as well as with the cultures and communities 
potentially affected by the production of products. The normative ethical decisions 
and projectable outcomes are obtained through and by these interactions. Knowledge 
of the organism being used, the marketability of the product, the scale of produc-
tion, and the social and environmental impacts are all linked to the particular organ-
ism used. That is, the ethical evaluations of biofuel production varies depending on 
the organism used, the scaling applied, the prospects for environmental controls, 
expected social effects, communication of these, and the impact on local and world 
economics.
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Extended agency ethics describes the integrated approach to ethical decision- 
making as one that requires careful and critical consideration of integrated research 
and technological activities in order to reasonably predict possible outcomes. 
Ethical decisions concerning the potential use of Synechocystic- based biofuel is 
not something that comes as purely either backward looking assessment or forward 
speculation. The determination of what should be done is not something that can be 
judged solely on the basis of weighing up consequences of action, nor on the basis 
of rule- following—categorical or otherwise. Instead, ethical considerations—such 
as the permissibility of the development of some new technology (e.g. cyanobacte-
rial- based biofuels)—are determined according to the current research, the experi-
ential data amassed, the practitioners’ knowledge-making activities, and the 
potential for scaling up production of the biofuel products by industry. This means 
that the locus of normative agency and intentionality is distributed across the activi-
ties of research groups, tools, and the development of products.
In this way, extended agency provides an externalist view of justification. 
Justification for beliefs come not from the decision-making-inside-the-head version 
of internalism (as some set of brain-bounded intuitionism or reflective perception). 
Instead, a form of active externalism that distributes cognition socially and agency 
across spatiotemporal research practices is suggested to explain the nature of scien-
tific inquiry and the acquisition of knowledge. The ability to form research ques-
tions and pursue this kind of research depends on the aims of the system of 
practitioners within a particular research environment. As such, extended agency 
radically revises the conditions under which beliefs are considered to be justified. 
Justification can be on the basis of reflection on decision making as a form of mental 
cognition, but according to extended agency, what is taken to be mental cognition is 
not restricted to the brain but instead goes beyond the skull and can extend to tools, 
practices, processes, and other researchers and social research groups—social cog-
nition. Both epistemic credit and ethical culpability are distributed notions that 
extend beyond the individual human agent. If social cognition, the social aspect of 
scientific practice, and the extended mind thesis are taken seriously, mental states 
(usually restricted to the brain by internalist evidentialists) are extended not only 
beyond the brain and skin of the individual but to include other spatiotemporally 
distinct biological, technological, and socially extended entities. With this extended 
cognition, a requisite extended agency and normative ethics based on this actively 
externalist theory of evidence follows. In some meaningful sense, extended agency 
can be understood to be a kind of role-based approach to ethics that demarcates 
categories of valuation analogous to those epistemic categories (outlined in the first 
half of this chapter). That is, to act in a role is to act according to a category of activ-
ity or to follow a model or prototypic way of acting. It may be profitably understood 
as being akin to an Aristotelian notion of virtue or a context- driven valuation. The 
intimacy of epistemic and ethical knowing is explicitly articulated by a number of 
virtue ethicists (see in particular Swanton’s 2003: 249 “virtues as prototypes”). 
Instead of understanding morality as being based on a set of rules, this approach 
takes virtues to be frameworks. These frameworks are built from interactions and 
in-practice experience that both shapes and is shaped by future interactions in the 
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world (Swanton 2003: 279). Christine Swanton’s “virtues as prototypes” can be 
seen as a more restricted version of my extended agency ethics. Whereas Swanton 
limits knowledge of the world to agent-based interactions, I extend it further to 
include agent-object based interactions. That is, I include interactions between 
humans, but also between humans and their objects, technological artefacts, and 
tools of investigation.
I hope my extension will help to build a bridge between philosophy of science 
and sociology of science. The bridge can be understood in terms of a shared locus 
of research: the study of interactions and associations between social actors. The 
interactions between social actors—whether they be technological artefact, machine, 
or human—consist of a system of valuing within these systems of scientific prac-
tices. The normative status of the interactions, objects, and human actors comes 
from the valuing of practitioners, the scientific methods they choose, activities that 
they participate in, the tools and measuring devices that they select in their field of 
study to use, and the meaning attached to the information gained from those tools. 
These all constitute sources of meaning within the use and interaction with them in 
various ways. The aim of the extended agency approach outlined here has been to 
begin to explain agent-object based interactions within scientific research groups. In 
the next section, I suggest that these object-human interactions can be best under-
stood through a combined sociology and philosophy of science.
5.2  Bridging Philosophy of Science and Sociology of Science
In his pivotal paper, “Mixing humans and nonhumans together: the sociology of a 
door-closer”, Bruno Latour, (writing under the pseudonym “Jim Johnson”), sug-
gests that studying the interaction between humans, machines, and tools should be 
the remit of a more widely extended approach to the study of sociology of science. 
He argues that if things we commonly refer to as a tool or a machine affect the way 
we interact in the world, then they might also be considered social actors. Considering 
them as such would blur the line that is often drawn between what is “purely technical” 
and what is “purely social” (Latour 1988: 198). He shows by means of a series of 
examples, (e.g. a hydraulic door closer and a red stop light), that some technological 
objects prescribe the behaviours of humans who interact with these artefacts. He 
focuses in particular on tools and technological objects that stand in for humans or 
take on the work of humans, (e.g. the hydraulic door opener that takes on the job of 
a human groom who opens the door for us, or a traffic light that takes on the job of 
a police officer who signals that we should stop in traffic). Although they are not 
human, the hydraulic door opener and the traffic light determine the norms of 
behaviour considered appropriate when we encounter them and sets the normative 
terms of interaction. That is, we interact with the non-human door-closer and the 
traffic light in terms of the roles each occupies. Knowing the role these technologi-
cal objects play means that we also know what actions we should take in response 
to them. They bring with them the norms for how to interact with them. That these 
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technological artefacts might be informed by our interaction with a polite human 
opening a door for us or a police officer who directs traffic in an area where no traf-
fic lights exist does not seem to count against the normative interaction present 
when we drive up to a light and act according to certain norms. That the light is not 
a person doesn’t mean we fail to understand that we should stop when it changes to 
red. The object in some sense normatively frames our experiences with it. It inter-
acts with us in terms of how it interprets our role in the interaction. Latour calls the 
normativity that arises from the machine’s presuppositions about the role of the 
human user, “prescriptivism”.
Prescriptivism is whatever a scene presupposes from its transcribed11 actors and authors 
(this is very much like ‘role expectation’ in sociology, except that it may be inscribed or 
encoded in the machine). For instance, a Renaissance Italian painting is designed to be 
viewed from a specific angle of view prescribed by the vanishing lines, exactly like a traffic 
light expects that its users will watch it from the street and not sideways. In the same way 
as they presuppose a user, traffic lights presuppose that there is someone who has regulated 
the lights so that they have a regular rhythm (Latour 1988: 306).
Latour suggests we consider interactions with scientific objects and technologi-
cal artefacts (and not just people) to be social interactions. As such, he argues that 
sociology should treat the material or technological objects we relate to as not just 
of peripheral social interest but of direct sociological significance. Doing so requires 
what Andrew Pickering calls “a decentering of the social relative to the material and 
the conceptual, in terms of both objects of analysis and explanatory formats” 
(Pickering 2005: 352). The current chapter attempts to follow Pickering’s approach 
to decentered sociology by “exemplifying empirically and theoretically what a 
decentered sociology can look like, in the hopes of encouraging others to follow” 
(Pickering 2005: 353). In the above, I have attempted to provide a case study of how 
the tools and assembly methods chosen by synthetic biology practitioners may be 
themselves a sociological topic as well as a philosophical topic. They affect the 
process of knowledge production as well as the normative judgements of practitio-
ners about the products produced within the collaborative social practice of research 
itself. Sociological investigation of the material and conceptual tools that affect 
knowledge production within labs may sheds light on how tools and decisions about 
tool use within systems of practitioners are made. In this way, normative as well as 
epistemic aspects of scientific research seem to require an understanding of social 
relations and not just a philosophical explanation of knowledge production. A 
decentered social theory and a decentered philosophical theory that focus on the 
role of technological objects may provide the best account of the normative interac-
tions within collaborative groups of scientists.
11 Latour uses “transcription” and “inscription” to explain the transition from a less durable dele-
gated agent to perform an action to a more reliable one. For instance, “the replacement of a police-
man by a traffic-light” is an instance where the traffic light is delegated the work that was done by 
a police officer. In Latour (1988), the focus is on descriptions of meaning that these actors play 
within a particular semiotic script. How actors are defined and what is meant by their roles in a 
particular scenario.
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6  Concluding Remarks
The account of both epistemological and ethical ineliminability of scientific prac-
tice developed here aims to provide non-reductive grounding to knowledge in 
social cognition and within social enterprises. The possibility of critical dissent by 
the individual practitioner against the protocols, types of reasoning, modes of 
knowledge transmission, or generation of research questions affirmed by the com-
munity is what is required for knowledge. That requires the role of the practitioner 
as individual agent to be something that is irreducible to the social group or system 
of practice itself. Rather than a relationship of reduction of the individual to the 
social, the individual practitioner as agent can been understood to be working 
towards the goal of scientific knowledge and the performance of it using diverse 
methods. The practitioner extends her knowledge by making connections with 
other practitioners, making use of protocols endorsed by the community, using 
reliable model organisms to make her hypotheses, critically responding to accepted 
routes of knowledge generation, and networking her resources together in the per-
formance of scientific inquiries. As an agent, she brings these resources together 
and in turn becomes a resource within the system of practice that she works within.
Investigating a practice-based route of acquiring knowledge within synthetic 
biology presents an alternative way of exploring traditional metaphysical questions 
in philosophy such as: What are the kinds of things synthetic biology produces? 
What is the relationship between parts and wholes? It also introduces new questions 
about what it is to be a part or indeed the property of partness itself within a new 
field; questions not just of interest to metaphysicians of science. Instead of seeking 
to understand the use of epistemological and ontological categories in practice from 
the premise that their existence can be known a priori or contained within the theo-
retical framework of the discipline that uses them, this approach runs in the opposite 
direction. It instead suggests that categories come into being in practice and from 
these categories-in-use theoretical concepts, notions of causal directionality, func-
tional architectures, and normative valuation arise through the active engagement of 
systems of practitioners.
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